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Background: Research suggests that “silence”, i.e., not voicing safety concerns, is common among health care
professionals (HCPs). Speaking up about patient safety is vital to avoid errors reaching the patient and thus to
prevent harm and also to improve a culture of teamwork and safety. The aim of our study was to explore factors
that affect oncology staff’s decision to voice safety concerns or to remain silent and to describe the trade-offs they
make.
Methods: In a qualitative interview study with 32 doctors and nurses from 7 oncology units we investigated
motivations and barriers to speaking up towards co-workers and supervisors. An inductive thematic content analysis
framework was applied to the transcripts. Based on the individual experiences of participants, we conceptualize the
choice to voice concerns and the trade-offs involved.
Results: Preventing patients from serious harm constitutes a strong motivation to speaking up but competes with
anticipated negative outcomes. Decisions whether and how to voice concerns involved complex considerations
and trade-offs. Many respondents reflected on whether the level of risk for a patient “justifies” the costs of speaking
up. Various barriers for voicing concerns were reported, e.g., damaging relationships. Contextual factors, such as
the presence of patients and co-workers in the alarming situation, affect the likelihood of anticipated negative
outcomes. Speaking up to well-known co-workers was described as considerably easier whereas “not knowing the
actor well” increases risks and potential costs of speaking up.
Conclusions: While doctors and nurses felt strong obligation to prevent errors reaching individual patients, they
were not engaged in voicing concerns beyond this immediacy. Our results offer in-depth insight into fears and
conditions conducive of silence and voicing and can be used for educational interventions and leader reinforcement.
Keywords: Communication, Safety culture, Qualitative research, Patient safety, OncologyBackground
Communication breakdowns among healthcare profes-
sionals (HCPs) have been identified as a major threat to
patient safety and to the prevention of errors [1]. Speaking
up about patient safety is vital to avoid errors reaching the
patient and thus to prevent harm and also to improve a
culture of teamwork and safety. “Speaking up” can be
defined as assertive communication in clinical situations
that require (immediate) action through questions or* Correspondence: schwappach@patientensicherheit.ch
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article, unless otherwise stated.statements of opinion or information with appropriate
persistence until there is a clear resolution [2,3]. This type
of problem-focused voice can be distinguished from
suggestion-focused and opinion-focused types of voice [4].
“Silence”, i.e., not voicing safety concerns, however, is a
common behaviour among health care professionals
(HCPs). The “Silence Kills” study revealed that 85% of
nurses had been warned of a problem by a safety tool, e.g.,
the surgical safety checklist, but 58% had also been in
situations where they felt it was unsafe to speak up to their
colleagues [5]. St. Pierre et al. conducted a full-scale simu-
lation study in anesthesiology to observe speaking up be-
haviors. Nurses and residents challenged an attending inMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
tp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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including fatal drug administrations [6]. Speaking up be-
haviour of nurses has been associated with improved team
performance of operating room teams in a simulation
study [7].
Little is known about factors that determine HCPs’
willingness to speak up for safety. In interdisciplinary
action teams, e.g., in operation rooms, two barriers have
been identified that inhibit speaking up: Power discrep-
ancies, e.g., between nurses and surgeon, and staff ’s lack
of conviction that their input is needed and desired, i.e.,
little motivation that makes the effort and risk worth-
while [8]. In a qualitative study in midwifery, agency for
safety (the willingness to take a stand on an issue of con-
cern) fluctuated strongly in relation to context and social
relationships between involved health care professionals
[9]. Novelty of an alarming situation and the fear to
damage personal relationship inhibited agency for safety.
In a survey among US and Japanese residents, the deci-
sion to challenge a senior surgeon in the operating room
was affected by the relationship and anticipated response
of the superior [10]. Lyndon et al. conducted a quantita-
tive vignette survey about speaking up about safety con-
cerns in labour and delivery [3]. Potential for harm
ratings were the strongest single predictor for likelihood
of speaking up. Among all respondents, 12% were reluc-
tant to speak up despite perceiving a high potential for
harm to the patient. The association of harm rating and
likelihood of speaking up was attenuated by the hie-
rarchy of the professional involved in the case scenario.
From this preliminary research it can be concluded that
assessments of harm seem to play an important role in
HCPs’ speaking up behaviours and that these assess-
ments may differ between professional roles.
Research on organizational silence outside the healthcare
setting suggests that decisions to speak up are strongly
influenced by organizational context and their interaction
effects with individual-level factors [11]. Morrison and
Milliken define a climate of silence as one characterized by
two shared beliefs: (1) speaking up about problems is not
worth the efforts, and (2) speaking up is dangerous [12].
They developed a model in which the choice to remain
silent is driven by individual characteristics, organizational
characteristics, relationship with the supervisor, anticipated
negative outcomes, and the belief that speaking up will not
make a difference [13]. Detert and Edmonson conducted
research about improvement-oriented voicing in organiza-
tions [14]. The results confirm that employees have impli-
cit theories about leaders’ reactions to speaking up and
that these beliefs, which may or may not be accurate, limit
willingness to speak up. Opportunities for voicing concerns
seem to be evaluated for risk episodically and the range of
perceived risk of speaking up is considerable. As Okuyama
et al. emphasize, health care differs from other industriesin that speaking up for safety is primarily aimed at promot-
ing patients’ wellbeing and not that of the organization or
the self [15]. Preventing patients from expected and serious
harm constitutes a strong and immediate motivation to
speak up but competes with anticipated negative outcomes
and fears about personal consequences. Clearly, HCPs
make some trade-off when they decide whether to speak
up or not but there has been little research so far into the
factors that enter and constitute this trade-off in health
care in particular.
Most of the empirical evidence related to speaking up
in health care has been conducted in invasive care
(surgery, anaesthesiology) and in midwifery. There is a
paucity of research in other areas of medicine. In on-
cology, a multiprofessional and complex area of health
care, in which single small errors may result in serious
patient harm, effective and assertive communication
about errors and risky behaviours between team mem-
bers is essential. In cancer care, a variety of situations
could warrant speaking up including medication safety
concerns, in particular prescription and administration
errors or violations of safety tools and protocols for safe
medication practices, violations of hospital hygiene rules
(e.g., for patients in isolation), safety in the context of
invasive procedures (e.g., lumbar puncture, catheters,
ports), and also treatment decisions. Yet, nothing is
known about oncology staff ’s speaking up behaviours.
Patients are very vulnerable, on both somatic and psy-
chological dimensions, and professionals are typically
highly engaged in building and preserving a trustful rela-
tionship with patients. This may inhibit open communi-
cation about close-calls or safety rule violations and add
to the trade-off whether and how to express safety con-
cerns. At least when patients are observers of HCPs
speaking up behaviours, “promoting the patient’s well-
being” may be a catalyst for both, voice and silence. For
example, a nurse may feel that challenging a senior doc-
tor about hand disinfection in front of a patient would
threaten the trustful doctor-patient-relationship which
outweighs the risk of infection and consequently decide
to withhold her voice. The aim of our study was to ex-
plore factors that affect oncology staff ’s decision to voice
safety concerns or to remain silent. We address two re-
search gaps: The first concerns limited knowledge about
speaking up behaviour in oncology, a special area of
clinical care for the reasons outlined above. The second
gap results from a lack of theory in models of speaking
up in health care. In a qualitative interview study with
doctors and nurses from oncology units we investigated
reasons, facilitators and barriers to speaking up towards
co-workers and supervisors. We conducted semi-struc-
tured interviews rather than a quantitative survey to be
able to gain a deeper understanding of the factors affec-
ting deliberate decisions to speak up rather than using
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knowledge about how HCPs arrive at their decisions to
voice concerns, something that is difficult to assess in a
survey. Our interview guide was inspired by theoretical
models of speaking up decisions by Milliken et al. and
Morrison [4,13]. These general models of voicing be-
haviour have recently been modified and adapted to the
health care setting [15]. We used thematic content
analysis to identify common themes and dominant
arguments. Thematic content analysis is a qualitative
descriptive methodology which requires a lower level of
interpretive complexity, as compared to grounded theory
or phenomenology and thus seems adequate for a re-
search question conducted within a theoretical frame-
work [16]. Based on the individual experiences of HCPs
from different professional groups and of different hier-
archical status, we aimed to conceptualize the choice to
voice concerns and the trade-offs involved and thereby
to contribute to the theoretical refinement of existing
models.
Methods
Interviews
We conducted semi-structured interviews with expe-
rienced oncology staff. The topic guide was developed
based on prior research, the literature, and discussions
with oncology experts [13,17-19]. The interviews began
with general questions about how often participants ex-
perience situations that they felt would require voicing
their concern and whether they generally feel comfort-
able to raise patient safety issues with co-workers and
supervisors in their team. The central part of the in-
terview asked participants about situations where they
experienced concerns about patient safety and decided
whether and how to communicate them. Participants
were inquired to describe these situations and the con-
textual factors surrounding them. We asked respondents
about the reasons and motivations (drivers, ambitions)
underlying their decisions to voice concerns or remain
silent. They were encouraged to elaborate on facilitators
and barriers affecting their choices for articulating safety
concerns. We did not explicitly ask for “trade-offs”,
“anticipations”, “calculations” or similar concepts nor
did we use these terms.
Sample
Six hospitals participated with seven oncology depart-
ments in Switzerland. These included three regional hos-
pitals and two university hospitals with adult oncology
units, and two paediatric university hospital departments.
Nurses and doctors working at the oncology departments
of the participating hospitals received written study infor-
mation and were invited to register for an interview. Inter-
viewees were purposively sampled to include doctors andnurses, staff working at the ambulatory oncology units or
on ward, and with sufficient working experience in on-
cology. Interviewees gave prior written informed consent.
Interviews were conducted face-to-face at the hospitals
by a trained and experienced research assistant, audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The study was exemp-
ted from full ethical review by the Cantonal Ethics
Committee (KEK-StV-Nr. 58/13).
Data analysis
An inductive thematic content analysis framework was ap-
plied to the transcripts [20-23]. After listening to inter-
views and reading the transcripts to become familiar and
get a sense of the whole, two researchers independently
analysed and coded a subset of transcripts (open coding)
using a mixed-methods research software [24]. The texts
were excerpted into units of meaning (words, sentences or
paragraphs). Emergent themes and recurring ideas were
identified and classified in terms of the concepts arising
from it. The code structure was discussed and revised and
applied to the next subset of transcripts in an iterative
process. Again, areas of disagreement were discussed in
feedback-loops to increase validity [22,25]. New codes
were added as additional themes emerged and some codes
were eliminated. The finalized code structure was then ap-
plied to all transcripts by both researchers, and any dis-
crepancies were solved [21,26]. Categories were abstracted
as far as possible by grouping sub-categories as categories
and categories as themes [22]. For the purpose of this ana-
lysis, we concentrate on content related to the decision to
communicate safety concerns. Data were organized in
major themes relevant for the research question. Repre-
sentative quotes were selected. Throughout, we use the
term “observer” for the professional who detected an error
or violation of safety rule (the interviewee) and “actor” for
the person who performs the questionable behaviour or to
whom the error was attributed to.
Results
Interviews were conducted with 32 doctors and nurses
in oncology. The interviews lasted between 21–58 mi-
nutes (mean 42 minutes). Characteristics of the partici-
pants are provided in Table 1. Participants reported a
broad range of detailed situations where they had expe-
rienced safety concerns and decided whether and how to
communicate these to their co-workers or supervisors.
Errors in the context of medication safety and rule
violations in hygiene and isolation practices were the
most commonly described safety issues which prompted
concerns. Participants felt generally comfortable voicing
concerns, in particular related to medication safety.
However, they provided numerous and diverse reasons
for and against speaking up and elaborated how these
enter the choice to voice concerns.
Table 1 Characteristics of participants
Characteristic Count %
Age (median = 35 years, range = 23-62 years)
20-35 years 18 56
36-45 years 6 19
46-65 years 8 25
Female gender 22 69
Profession/function
Head nurse 3 9
Nurse 15 47
Resident 10 31
Senior doctor 4 13
Primary workplace
Ambulatory oncology unit 17 53
Ward 15 47
Hospital type
Regional 15 47
University: Adult oncology 11 34
University: Pediatric oncology 6 19
Months of work experience in oncology (median = 42 months,
range = 2-312 months)
1-18 months (<= 1.5 years) 13 41
19-83 months (1.5 – 7 years) 8 25
84 months and more (> = 7 years) 11 34
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The predominating, overarching motivation for voicing
concerns expressed by the vast majority of participants
was to protect patients from injury. All accounts of “pre-
venting harm” referred to individual identifiable patients.
Contrary, saving future unknown “lives” (e.g., by impro-
ving safety standards in the unit) was not mentioned as
motivation for speaking up at all. Other reasons for spea-
king up were only rarely mentioned. Notably, only two
participants explained that they voiced to protect a co-
worker from causing harm to a patient, what, in turn
would have serious consequences for the colleague (i.e.,
feelings of guilt and loss of reputation). Three doctors
elaborated that speaking up about patient safety would be
a proof of their seriousness and would contribute to one’s
positive image. Table 2 displays motivations to speak up
with example quotes.
Barriers to speaking up
Participants expressed a large variety of barriers to
speaking up and conditions and constellations conducive
of “silence” (Table 3 displays categories of barriers to
speak up with example quotes). A major barrier to ex-
pressing concerns was related to the presence of other
persons in the alarming situation. 20 respondents said,sometimes strongly, that avoiding exposure and humili-
ation of the actor in front of co-workers or patients was
the main barrier for voicing concerns.
A common concern raised by more than a third of in-
terviewees had to do with preserving trust of the patient.
Many respondents argued that pointing a co-worker to
an error or violation of safety rule with the patient
present would erode trust of patients and endanger the
caregiver-patient relationship. Hierarchical structures
and relations make it difficult to speak up for nearly all
participants. These expressions were usually accompan-
ied by vague beliefs that speaking up to superiors would
be “inappropriate”. Hierarchy was commonly mentioned
in conjunction with a knowledge/experience gap bet-
ween observer and actor. Observers questioned their
own interpretation of the incident or the potential harm
because the actor was much more experienced and
higher in hierarchy. Interviewees of lower hierarchical
status (e.g., residents) argued that social norms prohi-
bited them from speaking up to skip-level superiors and
they expected their direct supervisors to voice concerns.
If these direct supervisors fail to speak up it becomes
nearly impossible for residents to express their concerns.
Voicing concerns across professional groups was an
inconsistent factor in participants’ reports. Some nurses
found it easier to raise concerns towards doctors be-
cause they were not perceived as their line superiors;
others found it difficult to cross professional boundaries,
in particular to higher-level superiors.
Limited time was mentioned as a barrier for discussing
safety concerns in several contexts: First, participants re-
ported situations where they noticed errors or violations
which happened so quickly that they could not intervene
in time (e.g., a nurse saw a co-worker using wrong mater-
ial for a syringe). Notably, in only few of these occasions
the observer decided to discuss the issue afterwards, e.g.,
to prevent the same incident from happening again.
Second, respondents mentioned their own limited time
resources as reducing their willingness to voice concerns.
Finally, lack of time and stress on the part of the actor was
frequently mentioned as a reason for silence. Observers
did not want to disturb, or to make matters worse by
starting discussions, or feared negative responses of the
distressed colleague.
One third of participants expressed fears of negative
consequences of their speaking up. This mainly covered
fears of stimulating immediate (emotional) reactions,
being labelled as “difficult” and damaging good relation-
ships. 13 respondents argued that they would not voice
their concerns towards specific, individual co-workers or
supervisors because these were “difficult persons”. Futility
and resignation were also expressed by several respon-
dents. Respondents reported that earlier experiences of
speaking up did not have the desired outcome and thus
Table 2 Motivations to speak up
Motivation Example quotes from interviewees
Protect patient from harm • “Of course…to protect the child from the specialist.“ Resident, pediatric ambulatory unit (L131)
• “The point is that nothing serious happens. That is most important to me”. Nurse, pediatric ambulatory unit (L232)
Contribute to one’s image • “I had the feeling that it speaks in my favor. That it demonstrates that I take my job seriously”. Resident,
ambulatory unit (P127)
Protect the actor from causing harm • “…to protect the patient, and of course, the nurse, who made the mistake. It is a devastating experience
to be responsible for patient harm and I wanted to save her from that”. Nurse, ambulatory unit (P229)
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experiences concentrated on co-workers’ lack of compli-
ance with and violations of safety rules.
Risk assessment and deliberate trade-offs
It was apparent from participants’ reflections that their de-
cisions whether and how to voice safety concerns involved
complex considerations and trade-offs. Several inter-
viewees explicitly used the terms “trade-off”, “balance”,
“evaluations of risks and benefits”, “weighting”, and “riskTable 3 Barriers to speak up
Barrier Example quotes fro
Presence of other persons • “I do not want to h
Erosion of trust between patient and caregiver • “It is very challengin
These are very toug
is difficult. You cann
unit (L232)
Embarrassment and humiliation of the actor
• “This basic trust of t
Thus, not in front o
Hierarchical structures and relations • “Because I have the
to him [the chief of
Resident, pediatricExperience/knowledge gap (observer/actor)
• “I, as a junior docto
of experience. It…d
challenge someone
Resident, ambulato
Limited time • “If you have lots of
unit (C113)
Speed of the incident
Observer’s limited time resources • “He [the senior] has
And to hold him ba
Actor’s time constraints and distress • “Sometimes, raising
Resident, ambulato
Fears of negative consequences • “Fear, of course. Wil
• “..and when you are
confrontation is not
Prompt negative or harsh reactions
Being labelled as “difficult”
• “Because she is a s
tell her that she di
ward (J122)
Damaging good relationships
Actor’s personality
Occupational group constellation (observer/actor) • “Simply, because he
up to a surgeon”. N
• “It is not really well
that we have no id
positioning of a pat
Futility and resignation • “If there is a person
Nurse, pediatric amassessment” when elaborating on this process. Subthemes
and example quotes are displayed in Table 4.
As most important component, the potential of patient
harm associated with an error or rule violation was
assessed and entered the “calculation”. While the moti-
vation to prevent patient harm was overarching, a third
of professionals elaborated extensively on the relevance
of the level of risk for their decision to speak up. Respon-
dents seemed to have systematically lower thresholds for
voicing medication safety concerns, compared to otherm interviewees
umiliate anyone”. Nurse, ward (C114)
g to speak up directly. There is the patient, and mother or father present.
h situations, where you know you should voice and you want to, and still, it
ot voice your concerns in front of the patient”. Nurse, pediatric ambulatory
he patient towards doctors, you do not want to shake their confidence.
f the patient, if possible”. Resident, ward (J118)
feeling… that it is just not done. I would be so worried with how to say it
department], that it would be too late then, or I would end up sweating”.
ward (J122)
r, just feel uncomfortable to speak up towards a senior colleague with ages
oesn’t feel right. You ask yourself whether these shoes aren’t too large…to
with lots of experience, knowledge and responsibilities. That’s a problem”.
ry unit (P126)
things to do you think, well okay, it just is like this now”. Nurse, ambulatory
several ward rounds to do, he is under stress, he is under time pressure.
ck with something like this – difficult”. Resident, ambulatory unit (B101)
concerns makes me feel guilty because time is so short at the rapport”.
ry unit (X110)
l I find the right words and tone?” Nurse, ward (J221)
still in training, challenging the supervisors is not good. Too much
good at all”. Resident, ambulatory unit (P127)
pecial character and beliefs that she does not make errors. When you
d something wrong she will be touchy for days”. Resident, pediatric
is a surgeon and we are nurses. Not everybody has the courage to speak
urse, ward (J221)
received if you as a doctor point them [nurses] to their lapses. They think
ea of these issues, .. removing catheters, check IV lines more closely or
ient. Thus we should remain silent”. Senior doctor, ward (B102)
, and you can say it over and over, and it doesn’t change. That is difficult”.
bulatory unit (L232)
Table 4 Trade-offs between voice and silence
Themes Example quotes from interviewees
Judging the level of risk • “This is a matter of risk assessment. Of course, there is the risk of infection, no doubt. But in this
case, the patient was not in a condition which would make an infection dangerous. But, if, for
example, she had had no leucocytes and would develop fever and she would have been at
high risk for an infection, than it would be a different situation. I do this risk assessment
mentally”. Resident, ward (J118)
• “It is a deliberate balance…when to voice, or how important it is, that you’ll have to voice, and
when you don’t have to. I believe there is some grey area. But if something is really dangerous
for the patient, then I have to speak up”. Nurse, pediatric ward (L230)
• “I evaluate how high the risk is and, with a missed hand disinfection, would not regard it as
high enough to say something. Contrary, if somebody would walk into an isolation room
without appropriate clothes, I would say ‘Stop’. No doubt”. Resident, ambulatory unit (B103)
• “But, if I see that someone gives the wrong IV to a patient, I would react immediately. Or if I
notice that the premedication was not given with antibodies and there is the risk that the
patient reacts, than I would instantly intervene”. Nurse, ward (C114)
Differing perceptions of harm between professions • “It is quite common that they [doctors] use unsterile gloves for the wound dressings and they
believe it’s sufficient. It is different from what we [nurses] learned in our education. I find it
difficult to argue. I have never experienced a wound has worsen because of that. But I ask
myself why do I take gloves, and they …don’t? What is the evidence then?“ Nurse, ward (X215)
Anticipation of negative outcomes (for the patient,
the actor, and themselves)
• “Because I would have had shown her [the actor, doctor] up, and the patient would become
anxious then. I wanted to avoid that”. Nurse, ambulatory unit (C113)
• “To me, the risk that something severe happens is considerably lower than the fact that the
chief ’s authority is questioned in front of the patient. This harm is considerably higher than not
disinfecting hands once”. Senior, ward (B102)
• “I feel that, if it would be really important for the patient, then I speak up. And I would even
speak up to the director, but it would cost me quite an effort”. Nurse, pediatric ward (J224)
• “I rather prefer to risk hassle; that she [the actor, senior doctor] would not respond adequately
and would be angry with me…I would rather hazard these consequences than doing
something I’m not fully convinced of or doing something which I know is not correct”.
Resident, ward (J118)
Predictability of the actor’s response • “In our team, you can forecast how the response will be. You know how people react, what
people can accept and what not. With someone you have only seen once or twice, you do not
know that”. Nurse, ambulatory unit (P225)
• “Because residents alternate so frequently, relations are not so much established and we do not
have the trust in them, and they probably not in us”. Nurse, ward (B205)
• “With the surgeons it is difficult in particular. I have known our oncologists for years now and I
know how they will respond to my speaking up. With doctors I see once a year, I find it difficult
to intervene”. Nurse, ward (X215)
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usually not perceived as justifying speaking up. Some in-
terviewees explicitly referred to differences in judgments
of potential of patient harm, in particular, between doc-
tors and nurses. On the other side of the calculation,
participants tried to anticipate possible negative out-
comes for the patient, the actor, and themselves.
For the calculation of potential costs of speaking up,
anticipating the actor’s response is prerequisite. The
“predictability” of the actor’s response to participants’
voicing behaviours was an important issue for nearly half
of interviewees. Speaking up to well-known co-workers
was described as considerably easier whereas “not know-
ing the actor well” increases risks and potential costs of
speaking up. Two constellations were perceived as par-
ticularly difficult: Residents in oncology rotation and
specialists from other departments (e.g., surgeons or
anaesthesiologists). Participants’ reports indicated that itwas the lack of predictability of the outcome and thus
“uncontrollability” that affected their willingness to
speak up.
Conceptualizing the decision to speak up
We conceptualize the contributions of motivations and
barriers to the decision to speak up as displayed in
Figure 1. The strength of the motivation to voice concerns
is based on an evaluation of the potential harm for the
patient. As noted above, clinicians described detailed risk
assessments following their co-workers rule violations.
The higher the potential for harm, the stronger (ceteris
paribus) the motivation to speak up. The perceived benefit
of speaking up (i.e. preventing harm) is countered by a
variety of fears related to anticipated negative outcomes.
These fears relate to the patient, the actor, and the self.
Despite anticipated negative outcomes, futility and resig-
nation decrease perceived effectiveness of speaking up,
Anticipated negative outcomes
Erosion of relationsship (patient/actor)
Humiliation of actor
Prompt negative reaction
Being labelled negatively or difficult
Damaged relations (observer/actor)
Contextual factors
Safety issue
Presence of patients or co-workers
Hierarchical structures and relations
Knowledge gap (observer/actor)
Involved professions
Actor's personality
Speed of incident
Limited time resources (observer)
Time constraints and distress (actor)
Futility and resignation
Motivations to speak-up
Protect patient from harm
Protect the actor form causing harm
Positive impact on public image
Decision to 
voice concerns
Evaluation of 
risk of harm
Trade-off
Unpredictability of actor's response
Figure 1 Conceptual model of the decision to voice concerns.
Schwappach and Gehring BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:303 Page 7 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/303i.e., the perception that voicing concerns will not make a
difference (often experience-based) and thus the likeli-
hood of action. A number of contextual factors, such as
the presence of patients and co-workers in the alarming
situation, affect the likelihood and severity of anticipated
negative outcomes. Several personal accounts of inter-
viewees suggest that many of these contextual factors act
as interacting variables (moderators/mediators). For ex-
ample, the strength of the link between hierarchical status
of the actor and anticipated negative outcomes of speaking
up is probably moderated by safety issue to be voiced. The
unpredictability of the actor’s response limits feelings of
control and is thus conductive of "silence". Though this
factor can be regarded “contextual” it is of special charac-
ter as it affects the predictability of outcomes and thereby
the entire trade-off and decision making process.
Discussion
In this study we explored motivations and barriers to
speaking up perceived by doctors and nurses in oncology.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which
assessed speaking up behaviors in the context of cancer
care. Participants reported many situations in which they
felt comfortable to voice their safety concerns towards co-workers and supervisors. However, episodes of remaining
silent were a common experience among staff and were
reported by all professions and hierarchical levels. The
fundamental motivation for speaking up was to protect in-
dividual, identifiable patients from harm. While doctors
and nurses felt strong obligation to prevent errors and
safety violations reaching the patient, they were not
engaged in voicing concerns beyond this immediacy. Pre-
venting future harm in “statistical patients”, improving
safety systems, or contributing to a learning organization
were not mentioned as motives to voice concerns. This is
exemplified by episodes in which observers could not stop
the error or questionable behavior in due time. Only rarely
had the observers taken opportunity to discuss the event
later. Thus, actors in these episodes did not receive feed-
back on their performance. This is an important and novel
finding. From a systems and learning perspective situa-
tions in which "statistical, future patient lives" are at stake
and threatened by risky behaviours, may be even more
relevant. Even if a clinical error cannot be prevented from
reaching an individual patient, speaking up post-hoc
would be important to avoid the error recurring and to
open opportunities for learning and changing behaviour.
Further research is needed into low-threshold interventions
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as after action reviews or medication event huddles [27,28].
While our study confirms many of the facilitating and
impeding factors affecting voicing behavior reported in
previous research, we also report some novel findings
which may be characteristic for oncology and similar areas
of clinical care. Staff reported various barriers for voicing
concerns and weighted anticipated benefits against nega-
tive outcomes, e.g., damaged relationships or humiliation
of a co-worker. In particular, many respondents reflected
in detail on whether the level of risk for a patient “justifies”
speaking up and its associated costs. Questions and con-
cerns relating to medication safety were much less likely
to remain unexpressed compared to violation of safety
rules, issues related to hygiene and isolation. Also, staff
was highly concerned with damaging (often long and in-
tense) patient-provider relationships, trust of patients, and
putting additional burden on the severely ill, and this was
a strong motivation to withhold voice whenever patients
or family were present. Whether this motivation is as
strong outside oncology has yet to be confirmed. Ob-
viously, there exists an imaginary threshold of potential
harm (likelihood and severity) which enters the “internal
calculus” whether and how to voice concerns. Of note,
many individuals were well aware of the trade-offs they
make. It is concerning that nurses and doctors believe that
they are able – often within a heartbeat – to accurately
estimate the risks associated with a specific behavior in a
specific patient, e.g., not using gloves for lumbar puncture
in a child. This “relative” interpretation of safety rules
caused dissonance in some oncology nurses and resulted
in feelings of resignation and futility often termed as
“acquiescent silence” in the organizational silence litera-
ture [4]. We suggest that nurses and residents need to be
encouraged by unit leaders to defend these safety rules.
Importantly, supervisor’s attitudes to silence, and thus the
micro-climate, are a key predictor of employees silence
behavior [29].
Nembhard and Edmondson recently introduced the
concept of leadership inclusiveness, which describes
“words and deeds exhibited by leaders that invite and
appreciate others' contributions”, including speaking-up
[30]. Based on survey data obtained in neonatology they
report that leader inclusiveness predicts staff psychological
safety, an important antecedent of speaking-up. This
stresses supervisors’ role in establishing and reinforcing a
“culture of voice” [31]. The unambiguous safeguarding by
leaders is of significance if resident rotation and frequent
co-operation with external specialities makes the predict-
ability of consequences of speaking up difficult.
The relevance of fears relating to damaging social rela-
tionships and being labeled negatively is supported by
previous research both inside and outside healthcare
[9,13,32]. However, in our study anticipated negativeeffects on the relation between patient and the actor
were even more critical barriers to voicing concerns.
The presence of patients, relatives and other co-workers
during the error or violation made the trade-off between
speaking up and remaining silent exceptionally difficult.
Participants often reported using questions, gestures and
non-verbal signals to point the actor to the problem, but
this communication was not always successful. More re-
search is clearly needed to identify voicing strategies that
would be acceptable to observers and actors in such sit-
uations. For example, teaching anaesthesia residents the
two-challenge rule, a conversational technique that is as-
sertive (advocacy) and collaborative (inquiry), increased
frequency and effectiveness of challenges towards other
physicians in operation room simulations [33]. Such in-
structional interventions could be transferred to settings
outside the operating room and seem particularly valu-
able for care teams involving different professions, speci-
alities, and hierarchies, like oncology. Based on the
findings of our study, we can clearly conceptualize sce-
narios with high and low difficulty of speaking up. These
scenarios could be used to discuss and train speaking up
behavior with oncology staff. They could also be embed-
ded in a survey study as vignette case stories to estimate
the relative, quantitative importance of different factors.
More generally, the results of our study could be helpful
to develop health care specific survey measures to assess
trade-offs in voicing decisions.
Our study generally confirms existing models of em-
ployee voicing behaviors [4,13] but also suggests some re-
finements and adjustments. In particular, we suggest some
important contextual variables which are likely to have
moderating and mediating effects in the health care set-
ting (e.g., the presence of patients and family). The role
and prevalence of perceived unpredictability of speaking
up situations as a result from less known co-workers
warrants further study. Our extended model of voice and
silence can be used to generate hypotheses and quantita-
tive testing.
Limitations
The main limitation of our study is associated with the
design: Our findings are based on clinicians’ reports of
motivations and barriers. As such, they rely on partici-
pants’ introspection and are subject to various biases. For
example, clinicians’ judgments of “low harm” associated
with others’ behaviors may result from post-hoc rationali-
zations of their own failures to speak up rather than from
concurrent risk assessments. Ethnographic observation
would be an alternative to study speaking up behaviors in
the field. However, the effects of contextual factors on
HCPs’ voicing behaviours are not easily accessible and
controllable in observational studies. As Tangirala argues,
“silence” is a nonbehavior and as such difficult to observe,
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observation is a strong and valuable method to gain an in-
depth understanding of HCPs’ real behaviours, it is limited
to actual occasions and, by definition, cannot be extended
to answer 'what if' questions. We propose future research
to employ a triangulation of methods, including qua-
litative observation and quantitative surveys under experi-
mental designs. Also, the extension of simulation studies
to outside the operating room would be highly valuable.
Conclusions
HCPs in our study were often comfortable to voice their
safety concerns towards co-workers and supervisors but
also experienced multiple barriers. In particular con-
cerning medication safety, there exists a well-established
culture that expression of questions and concerns is ex-
pected and desired. Preventing cancer patients from
harm is the dominating motivation for voicing concerns
even if speaking up is perceived as dangerous. However,
clinicians need to be made aware of the importance and
value of speaking up beyond the particular situation and
the current patient involved. Our results offer in-depth
insight into fears and conditions conducive of silence
and voicing and can be used for educational interven-
tions and leader reinforcement.
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